Not all forms of terrorism are the same. The terrorism of anarchist groups differs from that of revolutionary groups, and, as is often stressed, terrorism stemming from fundamentalist religions differs yet again. Nonetheless, the perpetrators of each type aim to challenge the society which they target. In other words, a terrorist act is, among other things, a direct confrontation with a society and way of life. Because of this, terrorism can be seen as a philosophical challenge insofar as certain ways of thinking underlay both the terrorist activities and the societies which are attacked. Seen in this way, terrorism is not merely a physically violent activity, but also an intellectual activity that is part of an argument that forwards one way of life, one way of thinking, over another.

The challenge, then, posed by terrorism is multiple; it is political, philosophical and communicative. Politically, terrorism demands a response commensurate with the violence enacted against the state and its subjects, philosophically, terrorism must be identified and distinguished from other violent activities, and communicatively, specific types of terrorism must be interrogated to discern their distinctive message. Typically, the political response takes precedence, for a continued threat to life cannot go unanswered by a society that wishes to maintain its existence. However, unless one asks about the other modes of challenge, the philosophical and communicative, political responses risk being misplaced and overreaching. Without a proper definition, the label ‘terrorism’ devolves into a dangerous rhetorical device for sanctioning questionable, repressive political practices since the word terrorism is freighted with negative moral and political connotations: to be a terrorist is to be placed within the province of legitimate punishment and restraining practices. Having arrived at a definition of terrorism, though, is not a sufficient response because particular acts of terrorism bear distinct communicative force stemming from the situations in which they arise. Overlooking the communicative challenge encourages political respondents to act indiscriminately, to misunderstand their opponents, and to encourage further terrorist acts since the message borne by such acts remains unrecognized.

The present essay focuses on the philosophical and communicative modes of response to Islamist terrorism. It begins by arguing for a definition of terrorism as communicative praxis, as an act of communication by an individual or group directed toward others in order to convey an argument and message. Insofar as terrorism is a type of communicative praxis, political responses need not be exclusively retributive and defensive in nature. To understand the range of political responses available, however, it is necessary to give attention to the expressions, or conveyance of meaning, that distinguish the communicative praxis of one terrorist act from another. Consequently, the essay proceeds by looking to the writings of Sayyid Qutb, the foundational thinker for Islamists, to illuminate the communicative force of Islamist terrorism. The communicative praxis of Islamist terrorism is a complicated affair involving elements that demand violent reactions and others that are avenues for conversation and prevention. The final section argues for responses to the communicative praxis of Islamist terrorism according to its political, philosophical and communicative modes.