For an up-to-date CV, please visit www.kemcrimmins.com.

Kem Crimmins

Ph.D. Candidate

Department of Philosophy

Fordham University

Curriculum Vitae

Contact Information

Department of Philosophy

441 E. Fordham Rd.

Bronx, NY 10458

automotive forum

E-mail: kem.crimmins @ gmail.com

Educational Record

Ph.D. (Philosophy), Fordham University, Bronx, NY, expected defense date: spring 2009

• Dissertation: Husserl and the Problem of Normativity
• Director: John J. Drummond
• Committee: John Davenport, Christopher Gowans, and James Marsh

M.A. (Philosophy), Purdue University, Lafayette, IN, May 1999

• Thesis: Gadamer and Hermeneutical Experience
• Director: Calvin O. Schrag

M.T.S. (Hebrew Bible), Vanderbilt Divinity School Nashville, TN, May 1997

A.B. (Religious Studies), Wabash College, Crawfordsville, IN, May 1995

AOS and AOC

AOS: Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy

AOC: Contemporary Ethics, History of Western Philosophy, Modern Moral Philosophy

Teaching Experience

Fordham University, Teaching Associate, Fall 2007, Philosophy of Human Nature (2 sections).

World Campus, The Pennsylvania State University, Instructor, Summer 2006-present, Business Writing (online).

The Pennsylvania State University, Lecturer, Fall 2005-Spring 2006, Rhetoric and Composition (7 sections).

Fordham University, Teaching Associate, Fall 2002-Spring 2004, Philosophical Ethics (4 sections) and Philosophy of Human Nature (3 sections).

Publications

Peer Reviewed Article

• "Transforming Necessity: Transcendental Logic after Cavailles," Philosophy Today 51 (2007): 148-153.

Edited Collection

• The Reason of Terror. Kem Crimmins and Herbert DeVriese, co-editors. Leuven, Belgium: Peeters Publishers, 2006.

Chapter in Book

• “Expressions of Terror: Rethinking Islamist Terrorism as Communicative Praxis,” in The Reason of Terror.

Co-authored Chapter in Book

• "Terror(ism) as a Philosophical Problem: Introduction to the 'Reason' of Terror" (with De Vriese), in The Reason of Terror.

Encyclopedia Article

• “Jean-François Lyotard,” in Encyclopedia of Science, Technology and Ethics. Carl Mitcham, editor. New York, NY: MacMillan Reference Books, 2005.

Book Reviews

• "Worst Cases: Terror and Catastrophe in the Popular Imagination." Metapsychology Online 10.46 (November 2006).
• “The New Husserl: A Critical Reader.” Auslegung 27.2 (winter/spring 2005).

Note

• “Book Notes: African Philosophy, The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, and Reason and Value.” International Philosophical Quarterly. 44.4 (Dec 2004): 606.

Conference Presentations

1. "Evidence and the Human Sciences: Rereading Husserl's "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science," Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences, Chicago, IL, 8-10 November 2007.

2. "Against Secularism: Religious Rhetoric in the Public Sphere," The End of Secular Thought?, Fordham University, Bronx, NY, 12-14 April 2007.

3. "Transforming Necessity: Transcendental Logic after Cavailles," 45th Annual Meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, Philadelphia, PA, 12-14 October 2006.

4. Comment on Jeremy Smith's "The Phenomenological Reduction and Aesthetic Experience," 36th Annuel Meeting of The Husserl Circle, Wellesley College, 22-24 June 2006.

5. "The Practical Relevance of Transcendental Phenomenology," 44th Annual Meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, Salt Lake City, UT, 20-22 October 2005.

6. “Terrorism and Justice,” The Reason of Terror: Philosophical Responses to Terrorism, University of Antwerp, 17-19 March 2005.

7. Comment on John J. Drummond’s “Value-Predicates and Value-Properties,” 34th Annual Meeting of The Husserl Circle, Washington D.C., 10-13 June 2004.

8. “Husserl’s Ethics and Moral Normativity,” Eleventh Annual De Paul Philosophy Graduate Student Association Conference, Chicago, IL, 2-3 April 2004.

9. “On the Possibility of Formal Ethics,” 42nd Annual Meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, Boston, MA, 6-8 November 2003.

10. Comment on Dennis E. Skocz’s “Husserl and the ‘Family of Man’: Diversity, Historicity, and Difference,” 33rd Annual Meeting of The Husserl Circle, New York, NY, 12-15 June 2003.

11. Comment on Neil Rosen’s “Transcendental Subjectivity and The Empirical Subject: Terms for a Husserlian Description of Bad Faith,” 1st Biennial Fordham Philosophical Society Graduate Philosophy Conference, Bronx, NY, 4-5 April 2002.

Conference Service

Co-organizer: The Reason of Terror: Philosophical Responses to Terrorism

University of Antwerp, 17-19 March 2005

Description: A joint conference between Fordham University and the University of Antwerp exploring philosophical responses to terrorism with an aim toward an intellectual exchange between US and Belgium graduate students.

Professional Service

Reviewer for Wadsworth-Thomson, fall 2006

President, Fordham Philosophical Society, Summer 2003-Spring 2004

Representative, Graduate Student Association, Fall 2003-Spring 2004

Paper Referee, Fordham Graduate Philosophical Conference, Spring 2004

Member, Symposia Committee, Fall 2002-Spring 2004

Secretary, Fordham Philosophical Society, Summer 2002-Spring 2003

Paper Referee, Fordham Graduate Philosophical Conference, Spring 2002

Awards and Honors

Fordham University, Presidential Scholarship, 2001-2004

Vanderbilt Divinity School, Owen Prize for Biblical Studies, 1997

Wabash College, Distinction in Comprehensive Examination (Religion), 1995

Wabash College, John N. Mills Fellowship in Religion, 1995

Wabash College, National Merit Scholarship, 1991-1995

Dissertation Description

The principal merits of my dissertation project can be divided into two categories: thematic and methodological. Thematically, the project addresses a central topic in contemporary ethics, namely the normativity of moral standards. Normativity refers to the way in which moral standards prescribe actions. However, whether there are conclusive reasons for obeying normativity remains an open question. Most current discussions start from either Hume or Kant. Typically followers of Hume claim there are no conclusive reasons for obeying normativity because only desires motivate persons to act. Kantians, by contrast, argue that agents are motivated by rational decisions that provide conclusive reasons for obeying normativity. By turning to classical Husserlian phenomenology, which remains an underdeveloped resource in moral philosophy, my dissertation argues for a third, yet unexamined alternative, which stresses how normativity combines the force of desires and the dictates of reason.

Methodologically, the project demonstrates how Husserl’s phenomenology can reorient moral philosophy. For Husserl, phenomenology describes how the world has meaning. My project underscores the way in which meaning occurs, that is, not for isolated, solipsistic subjects, but for persons in community. Consequently, my project’s engagement with Husserlian phenomenology counters a still prevalent trend, namely to treat moral agents as independent entities. Such predilections make little sense when one asks how agents experience moral standards as normative. Moral standards arise from moral traditions and are experienced by persons in community. To understand normativity, then, requires a description that attends equally to the weight of tradition, the pull of community, and the volition of the agent. By providing such a description, my project contributes to a greater understanding of Husserl’s work.

Some writings and TheKemBlog.